## A preferential, totally proportional electoral

## system without geographical divisions

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## Presentation plan

$\square$ Context
$\square$ Problems reported from FPTP electoral system and other alternatives
$\square$ Proposed solutions

- Preferential ballot
- Rallying procedure
- Integral proportional representation
- An option: the "crutch"
- Non-discriminatory district definition


## Separate the powers



## Separate the roles



## Advantages and deficiencies of the actual electoral system: First-Past-The-Post (FPTP)

- enhances government stability
- no quota
- not fair but simple
- few candidates to listen and know
- only one visit to the polling station
- same status for independant candidates
- individual accountability of the politicians
- a fixed number of elected members
- one vote, half-weight
- strongholds districts
- democratic deficit
- polarisation of the debate
- party line institutionalised
- less worst candidate
- electorate bribing
- gerrymandering
- confrontation of regions
- vote splitting issues
- low individual approbation rates
=> Keep these advantages without the inconvenients


## A Preferential, Proportional and

 Acirconscriptive System(SPPA in french)

- Separate the roles of defenders (municipal representatives) and deciders (Assemblée Nationale MP's )
- Reconcile stability and fair representation
- Give back their autonomy to the representatives
- Respect the actual voting mecanism


## Enhanced preferential ballot

$\square$ express sincere preferences

- split acceptable candidates from undesired candidates
- order in increasing preferences the acceptable candidates
$\square$ refuse all candidates
$\square$ identify an unfitted voter

| District n .4 |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Candidate $\mathrm{A} /$ Party A | O |
| Candidate $\mathrm{B} /$ Party B | 1 |
| Candidate $\mathrm{C} /$ Party C | 3 |
| Candidate $\mathrm{D} /$ independent | 2 |
| Candidate $\mathrm{E} /$ independent | O |
| None |  |

## Respect a traditional ballot

> | Ballot marked in a |
| :---: |
| traditional way |

## Equivalent in preferential terms



## Build the lists from results

Classical proportional systems

Pre-established order

1- David
2-Ben
3- Cécile
4- Alicia

Resulting list
Order determined from the supports received by each candidates of the same political party


## Election allowing to rally

## $\square$ Avoid vote-splitting issues (but not crowding or cloning)

- Like a leadership run-off: alternative vote (AV)
- Example:



## Results per districts

$\square$ Final supports at district n.4:
Candidate A $54 \%$
Candidate B $27 \%$
Candidate D $9 \%$
Candidate C 3\%
Candidate E 1\%
None $6 \%$

| Party \District | n.1 | n.2 | n.3 | n.4 | n.5 | n.6 | n. 7 | n. 8 | n. 9 | n.10 | Average |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Party A | 52 | 6 | 85 | 54 | 6 | 12 | 34 | 39 | 33 | 24 | 34,5 |
| Party B | 13 | 32 | 6 | 27 | 19 | 12 | 17 | 32 | 31 | 0 | 18,9 |
| Party C | 9 | 51 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 20 | 19 | 7 | 1 | 22 | 14,1 |
| Party D | 4 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 11 | 22 | 3 | 10 | 23 | 14 | 9,8 |
| Party E | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 2,5 |
| Independent | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 21 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 10 |
| None | 21 | 11 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 14 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 10,2 |

## Proportional representation to the integral limit

A) Determine first the number of seats for each party

| Party A | 34,5\% | / $8,98 \%=$ | 3,84 | vs | 4 elected members |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Party B | 18,9\% | / 8,98\% | 2,1 | vs | 2 elected members |
| Party C | 14,1\% | / 8,98\% | 1,57 | vs | 2 elected members |
| Party D | 9,8\% | / 8,98\% | 1,09 | vs | 1 elected member |
| Ind S. 5 | 4,6\% | / 8,98\% | 0,51 | vs | 1 elected member |
| Party E | 2,5\% | / 8,98\% | 0,28 | vs | 0 elected member |
| Ind S. 10 | 2,3\% | / 8,98\% | 0,26 | vs | 0 elected member |
| Ind S. 6 | 2,1\% | / 8,98\% | 0,23 | vs | 0 elected member |
| Ind S. 7 | 1\% | / $8,98 \%=$ | 0,11 | vs | 0 elected member |

B) Seats of each party are attributed to its candidates with most support.

Composition of the Parliament:
Party A: Candidates n.1, n.3, n. 4 and n. 8 .
Party B: Candidates n. 2 et n. 8 .
Party C: Candidates n. 2 et n. 10 .
Party D: Candidate n.9.
Independent n.5.

## Conciliate representation and stability



## Representation vs stability: the "crutch" option

$\square$ Representation exercise

- garantee at least coalitions of two parties
- compense with additional elected members the plurality party in order to reach $\lfloor 50 \%$ of the seats
- reduce the maximal length of the mandate in proportion:
- Preserve the invariant (nb elected members x time)

$\square$ Example:
- 30 elected members for an assembly of 70 persons
- => add 10 elected members to the winning party
- 40 elected members from a total of 80 seats
- validity: $30 / 40=75 \%$ of the original mandate length


## Non discriminatory districts

$\square$ Sampling of the electorate - different discretization

- Last digits of the social insurance number
- simple for 100 districts
- Birth dates (day, month, modulo of the year)
- simple pour 12 seats (municipal)
- simple for 365 districts
$\square$ Advantages
- No strategical nominations
- No bribing of the electorate
- No gerrymandering
- No regional confrontation
- Fair representation according to the electorate will


## A modular approach



## Three steps implementation

$\square$ The "crutch" option to garantee stable coalitions of two parties
$\square$ Fair representation

- Preferential ballot
- applied in Eire (Irish country)
- Election with rounds allowing to rally and build support
- applied in Australia
- Individual proportional representation
- applied in Finland
$\square$ Non-discriminatory definition of districts

